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THE EFFECT OF AN OVERRULING DECISION
JAMES A. SPRUILL, JR.*
This article is addressed to the problem of the effect of an over-
ruling decision upon parties who have acted in reliance on a rule of
law previously enunciated judicially. At the threshold of this study
stands the age-old question as to the nature of law. Some answer must
be given to this query. It cannot be a simple one. Indeed, it seems well
to stress that the -answer is intentionally complex and flavored with
compromise.
I. THE NATURE OF LAW
There is too much of the idea that truth is an all or nothing con-
cept. The application of a rigorous logic to the affairs of life may be
prolific of half-truths-of Jekyll-Hyde propositions which alternately
assume the cast of truth or error. Much that has been written about
law seems to bear this dual personality. Perhaps this is caused in part
by failure to keep in mind the several features of the problem. When
one turns to speculation about the law, he should be mindful of the
theoretical and the practical aspects of his problem. He should dis-
tinguish between what we might call, for want of better names, its
juristic and political phases. The first might be characterized as philo-
sophic speculation as to the nature of law of such a kind as a jurist
might entertain in the sanctuary of his study; the second, as those
practical considerations which should, and to a certain extent must,
be in the mind of him who sits upon the bench and, armed with the
power of the state, judges between and passes judgment upon his fellow
citizens.
A. The Juristic Phase
We shall begin with a brief examination of the theories of the nature
of law which pass current. But we cannot tarry to attempt a catalogued
exposition of the ideas of numberless thinkers. It is not our purpose
to attempt to 'detect nuances in philosophical theories. Rather, it is our
purpose to try to set forth in broad contrast the basic ideas of two great
antithetical schools which are of significance in the consideration of our
problem. This effort is made with the realization that it involves group-
ings which are to be justified, if at all, on the basis of the major
contrast rather than on the score of identity. The first of the schools
to which we refer is that which holds an idealistic conception of the
nature of law.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Georgia.
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It would seem to a non-subscriber that the idealist has indulged in
wishful thinking. Law, to him, is a Platonic ideal which possesses a
reality superior to that of the rules which lawyers study and cite and
judges apply.' We are told that "Law . . . is self-created and self-
existent";2 that "It is not, therefore, possible to vwke law by legislative
action" ;3 and that "Law not only cannot be directly made by human
action, but cannot be abrogated or changed by such action".
4 Still
another idealist says, "Law is a concept, a generalized abstraction at-
tained by mental processes." 5
Professor Beale, the most distinguished of the legal idealists of
today, recognizes a law, not sprung full bodied from the head of Jove,
but, more miraculously still, conceived, born, and dwelling in the collec-
tive mind of the legal profession. 6 The law is something which dwells
safe beyond the impact of judicial decisions. It is not changeless; but
to him, "It must be obvious that neither by legislative nor by judicial
legislation can the basic system of law be changed." 7 This basic system
of law, in England and America the common law, is to be distinguished
from the rules applied by the courts. It is the Platonic ideal to be
set in contradistinction to the particular.
Professor Beale wants something less fallible and changeable than
particular -decisions. The decision is, to him, not the law. The law is
the idea of the general which inheres in the particular. Such a theory
gives unity at a level above the diversity obviously present in the law
as applied by courts. Such an idealized theory of law, he says, yields
continuity. And to him, "predicability is possible only if the law is
continuous." s This predicability is of the ideal law and not of that
applied by the courts; so, presumably it is for the satisfaction of philoso-
phers rather than the service of clients. But Professor Beale's law
sometimes dwells in less ethereal realms. He speaks of a "reasonable
degree of certainty". 9 And this means no moi'e than a degree of
probability which may be predicated of a changing, shifting, judge-made
law.
And judge-made the law is, in whole or in part, says the opposing.
school. Austin speaks of ". . . the childish fiction employed by our
judges, that judiciary or common law is not made by them, but is a
'See discussion by Mr. Justice Cardozo in Great Northern Ry. v. Sunburst
Oil & Refining Co., 287 U. S. 358, 365, 53 Sup. Ct. 145, 148, 77 L. ed. 360, 366
(1932).
'CARTER, LAW: ITs ORIGIN, GROWTH AND FuNCTION (1907) 129.
'Id. at 130. 4 Ibid.
'Zane, German Legal Philosophy (1918) 16 MIcH. L. Rav. 287, 347.
"The law of a given time must be taken to be the body of principles which
is accepted by the legal profession, whatever that profession may be ..
I BEAL, CoNFLIcT OF LAWS (1935) 40.
1Id. at 35.SId. at 47. 9Id. at 46.
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miraculous something made by nobody, existing, I suppose, from eter-
nity, and merely declared from time to time by the judges."10 He
fully agrees with Bentham that judges do make law;"1 but he does not
look to the bench as the only law-making body. Professor Gray, how-
ever, looks to the courts as the sole makers of the law. He says: "The
Law of the State or of any organized body of men is composed of the
rules which the courts, that is, the judicial organs of that body, lay
down for the determination of legal rights and duties."' 2 And further:
".. . the judges are rather the creators than the discoverers of the
Law.3'1 Professor Gray is primarily interested in the decisions and sees
in them the true law.' 4  This he holds to be so even in the case of
statutes for the reason that they are implemented and given final mean-
ing only by judicial action.
Mr. Justice Holmes, in answer to the question from whence does the
law issue, says, ". . . it does issue and has been recognized by this
court as issuing from the state courts as well as from the state legis-
latures."'I5 And again, he says: "The prophesies of what the courts
will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the
law."'16 Mr. Justice Cardozo says: "I take judge-made law as one of
the existing realities of life."1 7
It would seem that anyone not writing fairy tales must recognize
that judges do make law.' 8  But recognition of this fact is by no means
the equivalent of saying that law is "a series of isolated dooms".' 9
The "free judicial decision", if considered as a generality, is as much
20 2 AusTin, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE (3d ed. 1869) 655.
" And unlike Bentham, he thinks they might do the job well. Id. at 549.1 2 GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW (2d ed. 1927) 84.
' Id. at 121.
' But note that there is still a trace of the idealist in him. He says: "If the
courts generally of a country follow certain rules, those rules do not cease to be
the Law because of a sporadic departure from them by a particular judge."
Id. at 116.
" Dissenting ojinion, Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U. S. 349, 372, 30 Sup.
Ct. 140, 148, 54 L. ed. 228, 239 (1910). See also his dissent in Black & White
Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U. S.
518, 532, 48 Sup. Ct. 404, 408, 72 L. ed. 681, 686 (1928).
6 Holmes, The Path of the Law (1897) 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 460.
" CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1925) 10.
"8 The courts are generally very hesitant to acknowledge this fact. But we
find one court recognizing it thus in speaking of one of its earlier decisions:
. . . the court, in illustrating what constituted the common law, said that if a
case was presented not covered by any law written or unwritten, the power of
the court is adequate, and it is the duty of the court to adopt such a rule of
decision as right and justice in the particular case seemed to demand, that, not
withstanding in such case the decision made the law and not the law the decision,
'this is the way the common law itself was made, and the process is still going
on,' and further that the common law was not unchangeable, and was not adopted
to remain perpetual and unaltered and unalterable, 'not to be tempered to our
habits, wants, and customs.'" Gross v. State, 135 Miss. 624, 632, 100 So. 177, 178
(1924) (a decision denying the common law right of a husband to chastise his
wife).19 See CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAw (1924) 54.
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a figment of the imagination as is the ideal law. The law of the decisions
has definite and recognized sources and this fact serves as a limitation
to judicial legislation. As has been said, the judge's is interstitial law-
making.2 0 In most cases the judge goes through the form of applying
the law much as the idealists would have us think he does in all cases.2 1
And even when the judge enunciates a new rule of law, his creation is
subject to influences and forces which, at least so far as the future is
concerned, act upon it somewhat in the manner of a referendum
22
By this it is meant that in those cases where the judge has more or less
complete freedom of action, the result of his choice may be great or
small. His rule is "the law of the case" for a particular set of litigants;
for others it is only a source of law. It may or may not become the law
of future cases.
B. The Political Phase
At this point we have reached the juncture (ill-defined, we confess)
where we pass over to what we have called the practical or political
aspect of our problem. Here it seems necessary to say a word about
certain human characteristics. The first of these is the psychological
fact that in general things seem better in retrospect. This has led men
to look to the past for rules of action which will furnish guidance and
justification and yield greater happiness to them; and, in so doing, they
have, in the field of law as elsewhere, been seeking a source and a limit.
They have sought thus to satisfy the dual and antithetical needs of
social flux and stability.23 And with instinctive wisdom, men have in
general placed primary emphasis on stability--on the conservation of
that measure of freedom and wealth which is theirs, be it great or small.
The idealists, when they set up their Platonic law, are but doing
what instinct prompts in most men. Man has a natural reverence for
institutional wisdom-for what seems to be the product of an illimitable
past. Institutions are both tested and hallowed by the passing of cen-
turies. So most men are willing to agree with Lord Coke that "the
wisdom of the law is wiser than any man's wisdom". But if the law be
regarded as a mere system of reason to be applied by individual judges,
it loses much. of its power as an instrument of social stability. The law
of the idealist is the law of the people because the bulk of them crave
the stability which it seems to offer.
Moreover, men seem to have a natural preference for judgment by
"0 See Gross v. State, 135 Miss. 624, 631, 100 So. 177, 178 (1924).
"1 Here the controversy between the schools is reduced to a matter of termi-
nology. The dispute is as to whether the judge discovers the law or merely turns
to sources for the law -which he himself makes or ordains for the particular case.
22 Perhaps the better analogy would be to popular recall.
22 For a discussion of this general problem, see CARDozo, THE PARADOXES OF
LEGAL SCIENCE (1927) Lecture One, p. 1.
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law rather than by individuals. Because of pride, or, perhaps, because
of religious instinct, they prefer to think that they make obeisance to
the law rather than to the magistrate. This leads to popular objection
to the free judgment of individuals, and to a demand for something not
unlike the Aristotelian concept of rule by a law which is dispassionate
reason.
Further, our particular part of the Anglo-Saxon world has taken
pains to ensure that the law should not be made and administered by
the same individual. The doctrine of the separation of powers is
enshrined in our Federal and state constitutions. It sprang from a
misinterpretation and from an unwarranted opinion of the simplicity of
government; but there it is, of a sacred origin and high in popular
esteem. The realist may say that it is now and always has been a
fiction. But still it is not a fiction which can be ignored. Constitu-
tional provisions are real limitations to the form of judicial legislation,
even though they do not prevent it.24
It seems to be of prime necessity that we should bear'in mind not
only the nature of the law which men have, but the nature of that which
they desire. We need realism-much more of it-, but we need a more
realistic realism. Mr. Jerome Frank shares Bentham's impatience of
fiction. To him the fiction that covers judicial law-making is crass
deceit. He says there might once have been a day for it, but that there
is no place for it in our "adult civilization". 25 But as we are very much
of the opinion that human aspirations and prejudices are still of vast
importance, we must stand up in defense of fiction. It offers the means
of reconciling our law in action with a theoretical system which is
unworkable. The rejoinder will doubtless be to throw overboard the
false theory and construct a new one which is in harmony with actual
facts and with the needs of society. There are at least two replies to
this. The first is an uncertainty. Perhaps, on the whole, popular
belief in an ideal law and the separation of powers produces socially
desirable results. The second is the statement that such beliefs present
an imponderable weight and are likely to defy destruction for genera-
tions. Such being the case, it seems that realism demands not that
jurists speak to the people in a strange tongue, but that they attempt
to meet the demands of the existing system. We should worry less
about the people who demand that they be fooled and more about that
part of the bench and bar which fools itself. The language of the law
suffices so long as those who use it do so with understanding.
"4 Eastman v. State, 131 Ohio St. 1, 1 N. E. (2d) 140 (1936).
" FRANx, LAw AND THE MODERN MIND (1930) 41. This is a bit reminiscent
of the enthusiasm of Revolutionary France which gave way to the realism of
Bonaparte.
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If courts abstain from practicing self-deception, there may be room
within our legal order for them to meet the greater part of the needs
which confront them. The fact of prime importance is that they can
and do legislate. It matters little how their action is designated.
This brings us to the point where we must decline to stand with
Satan or the Angels. We agree with the realists that the cotirts do
legislate. (However, we would stress the fact that they do so subject
to rather definite limitations.) So we would answer our theoretical
inquiry. But we would recognize that for practical reasons the courts
must, in most cases, talk the language of the idealists. This is a necessity
if they would serve under our present political and social order. The
demands upon our judiciary have been well stated, thus: "The judge
.. has as his prime duty to keep within measurable distance of filling
social needs as they arise, and as his second duty to stay within the
bounds of legal decency-which as the system we impose upon him
stands, means keeping measurably within the tradition-hallowed formu-
lae." 2 6 The formulae should and will change, probably to recognize
greater scope for judicial legislation; but this will be the work of gen-
erations. The great -duty of the jurist of any age is to meet the two
demands upon him which are named-in short, to serve his generation
and to serve it with an eye to the manner in which it would be served;
to do this and not to regenerate it. This is the belief which guides our
study.
II. CONCEPTS OF THE NATURE OF LAW AS GOVERNING THE RETRO-
ACTIVE EFFECT OF OVERRULING DECISIONS
Now, having taken a look at the law as it is, and the conditions
which it must seem to meet, we come to our principal task, which
is the consideration of the effect of overruling decisions. Here we find
that the courts, virtually without exception, speak the language of the
idealist. The logical result of the theory that judges do not make, but
only apply, the law is the requirement that an overruling decision be
given retroactive effect. Blackstone, after speaking of stare decisis
says: "Yet this rule admits of exception, where the former determina-
tion is most evidently contrary to reason; much more if it be clearly
contrary to the divine law. But even in such cases the subsequent judges
do not pretend to make a new law, but to vindicate the old one from
misrepresentation. For if it be found that the former decision is
manifestly absurd or unjust, it is declared, not that such a sentence
was bad law, but that it was not law; that is, that it is not the estab-
20 Llewellyn, Legal Tradition and Social Science Method-A Realist's Critique
(1931) BROOKINGS INSTITUTION ESSAYS ON RESEARCH IN TE SOCIAL SCIENCES
89, 106.
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lished custom of the realm, as has been erroneously determined."27
As one court has said: "The first decision, upon the point on which it
is overruled, is wholly obliterated, and the law as therein construed or
declared must be considered as though it never existed, and that the
law always has been as expounded by the last decision." 28 The courts
affirm that: "The decisions of courts are not the law. They are only
the evidence of the law. . ."" And one judge has said: "My conclu-
sion from a survey of the authorities is, that the fundamental rule still
holds, that is, that when former decisions are overruled they are con-
sidered as never having been the law, but that for a time they obscured
the true and sound law. . .. "30
Such a theory is a labor saving device for the courts.31 It saves the
occupant of the bench the necessity, often a disagreeable one, of appor-
tioning the incidents of the change among the litigants before him. It
offers a rule of thumb for allocating burdens and benefits and seems
to place the responsibility for the decision entirely upon the law rather
than the judge. Probably, too, this formula serves a higher purpose.
It may add to the political strength of the judiciary by making it seem
that the public's desire to be judged by a preexisting law is being met.
There seems to be an instinctive -dislike of the idea of ex post facto
laws.
A. Effect on Substantive Rights
It seems that the preexistence of the law is maintained because of
the extreme hesitation of the courts to admit that they make ex post
facto laws-criminal and civil alike. It does not matter that, as Pro-
fessor Gray points out, ". . . for most of the laity, the Law, except for
a few crude notions of the equity involved in some of its general prin-
ciples, is all ex post facto."32  So we find the paradoxical result that
271 BL. Comm. *69.
.Center School Township v. State, 150 Ind. 168, 173, 49 N. E. 961, 962 (1898).
Hibbits v. Jack, 97 Ind. 570, 578 (1884).
"Falconer v. Simmons. 51 W. Va. 172. 178. 41 S. E. 193. 196 (1902). See
also Allen v. Allen, 95 Cal. 184, 199, 30 Pac. 213, 215 (1892), where the court
said: "These decisions did not change the law; they simply declared what was
the law. Every one is conclusively presumed to know the law, although the
ablest courts in the land often find great difficulty and labor in finally determining
what the law is.'
"1 But note that it is not employed in all of the opinions which recognize
that overruling decisions should be given retroactive effect. For example, in
Stockton v. Dundee Mfg. Co., 22 N. J. Eq. 56, 57 (1871), the chancellor, in
.speaking of the effect on the law of the overruling Legal Tender case, says: "Now
it is changed; as much changed as the law of this state would be by statute,
but not in the same manner. A change by statute is only for the future. A
change by decision is retrospective, and makes the law at the time of the 'first
decision as it is declared in the last decision, as to all transactions that can be
reached by it."
12 GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW (2d ed. 1927) 100. This
fact seems to have been ignored in the cases dealing with the effect of over-
ruling decisions. Those courts which have refused to give such decisions retro-
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dislike of ex post facto laws seems to require a theory by which judikial
decisions are given retroactive effect. And the critics of the Black-
stonian theory raise up against it the emotions which gave it birth. But
if we pass over the inconsistency of a theory which produces in fact
that which it is designed to eliminate, we find that the results of its
operation may sometimes be -desirable.
1. GENERAL RULE
There are times when it is to be desired that a change in the law
should be given retroactive effect.3 3 For example, under a line of
Pennsylvania cases a divorced wife had no right to an accounting from
a divorced husband for income from property conveyed to them by
entireties. But in the case in which this rule was reversed, the court
granted the divorced wife this relief.34 It seems too clear for argu-
ment that if such a remedy was a desirable one it should have been
granted in the instant case where there was no showing that there had
been a settlement or division of property on the basis of the old rule.
And, in another case an appellate court reversed itself and sustained the
jurisdiction of a lower court which had been exercised in trying one
accused of a petty misdemeanor. 35 It seems obviously correct that a
party who had received a trial, to which only the jurisdictional objec-
tion could be taken, should not have been granted a new trial in another
court while the jurisdiction exercised by the trial court was recog-
nized as proper for the future. So also, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court, in sustaining a conviction in which the jury was not charged in
the long recognized formula to the effect that they "were the judges
of the law and the fact", held that the earlier decisions were wrong and
that the accused had no vested right to the procedural error enshrined
in them.
36
After the Supreme Court of the United States reversed its former
decisions protecting the income of federal and state employees from
intergovernmental taxation,37 Congress passed the Public Salary Tax
active effect seem to have been at least tacitly in accord with this statement of
the Montana court: "It is unnecessary that it be shown that reliance was actually
placed by defenidants upon the former decisions. Reliance thereon will be pre-
sumed." Continental Supply Co. v. Abell, 95 Mont. 148, 171, 24 P. (2d) 133,
140 (1933) (refusal to apply retroactively more stringent interpretation of the
banking laws so as to hold officers to personal liability).
" See von Moschzisker, Stare Decisis in Courts of Last Resort (1924) 37
HARV. L. REV. 409, 428.
", O'Malley v. O'Malley, 272 Pa. 528, 116 Atl. 500 (1922).
" State v. Williams, 13 S. C. 546 (1880) (Court of General Sessions held to
have concurrent jurisdiction with magistrate's court to try for thefts of less
than $20).
38 Commonwealth v. Castellana, 277 Pa. 117, 121 Ati. 50 (1923).37Helvering v. Therrell, 303 U. S. 218, 58 Sup. Ct. 539, 82 L. ed. 758 (1938);
Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U. S. 405, 58 Sup. Ct 969, 82 L. ed. 1427 (1938);
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Act of 193938 in response to a very considerable sentiment to the effect
that the new rule should not be given effect as to incomes earned in past
years. However, overruling decisions on questions of tax law have,
in general, been given retroactive effect; and, in most cases, it seems
desirable that this should be done. We have an illustration in the cases
which arose after Fox Film Corp. v. Doya 3 9 reversed the rule of Long
v. Rockwood 40 to the effect that income from patents and copyrights
was not subject to state taxation. If a party could be forced to con-
tribute to the support of the state government from his 1933 income
from these sources, there seems no injustice in requiring a like contri-
bution from his 1931 income. And the New York
41 and Wisconsin4 2
courts so held in upholding the right of the state to collect back taxes.
4 3
As the Wisconsin court observed, ". . . the Fox Film Corpbration Case
not only did not put any limitations upon its retrospective operation, but
applied its doctrine retrospectively to the facts there presented." 44 And
another court has but recently applied the same principle to the con-
verse situation, where taxes have been paid as required by a decision
which was subsequently overruled.
45
This last decision suggests a type of case where, because of another
rule of law, it is inconsequential whether the overruling decision be
considered as changing the law retrospectively or only for the future.
We refer to those cases where a payment or settlement has been made
on the strength of a decision which was subsequently overruled. If the
change is not retroactive, the parties can be said to have acted on a
correct view of the law and there is no basis for upsetting their settle-
ment. On the other hand, if the courts hold, as they are inclined to do,
that the later decision declares what the law is now and "was afore-
times", the party who seeks to open up the settlement, or recover the
Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U. S. 466, 59 Sup. Ct. 595, 83 L. ed.
927 (1939)
11 53 STAT. 574, 5 U. S. C. A. §84a. 26 U. S. C. A. §§22, 116 (Supp. 1939)."0286 U. S. 123, 52 Sup. Ct. 546, 76 L. ed. 1010 (1932).
40 277 U. S. 142, 48 Sup. Ct. 463, 72 L. ed. 824 (1928).
" People v. Graves, 242 App. Div. 128, 273 N. Y. Supp. 582 (3d Dep't 1934),
aff'd, 270 N. Y. 498, 200 N. E. 288 (1936), cert. denied, 298 U. S. 683, 56 Sup.
Ct. 953, 80 L. ed. 1403 (1936).
42 Laabs v. Wisconsin Tax Comm., 218 Wis. 414, 261 N. W. 404 (1935).
" Cf. Donohue v. Russell, 264 Mich. 217, 249 N. W. 830 (1933) (lessor
allowed to recover back rent after overruling decision held riparian owners owned
to the water line rather than to the meander line as held by earlier decisions).
" Laabs v. Wisconsin Tax Comm., 218 Wis. 414, 421, 261 N. W. 404, 408
(1935).
40 O'Malley v. Sims, 51 Ariz. 155, 75 P. (2d) 50 (1938) (inheritance tax
paid in accord with the rule of Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U. S. 189, 23 Sup. Ct.
277, 47 L. ed. 439 (1903), which decision was subsequently overruled in Farmers
Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U. S. 204, 50 Sup. Ct. 98, 74 L. ed. 371
(1930)).
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payment made, is met by the rule that there is no relief for a mistake
of law.
46
The rule which denies relief for mistake of law has been freely,
and, it seems, justly criticized ;47 but it appears firmly established in its
application to those cases where parties have made payments under mis-
take of law. 48 And it seems justified in the special case where the mis-
take was induced by a judicial decision which was subsequently over-
ruled. It can be maintained that in such a case the parties must have
realized the possibility that at some future date the courts might declare
the law differently. From this it can be argued that if, with this realiza-
tion, a party paid or settled rather than going to court and attempting
to obtain the benefit of a more favorable rule, he thereby chose to
assume the risk that the law, as it stood, was unduly prejudicial to him.
To accept this argument, as the courts are inclined to do, is to place
a great burden on the debtor; but it seems probable that in the average
case the value of effecting a settlement and saving the expense of liti-
gation will more than compensate for the risk of mistake which one is
forced to assume. This seems to be one of the situations where the law
can say with reason founded in the'social good, if not without hardship
to individuals, that it favors the termination of disputes, actual and
potential. If this opinion be accepted as correct, it can be affirmed that
the overruling decision presents no problem here whether the Black-
stonian theory be accepted or rejected.
These illustrations have been given as a suggestion that the Black-
stonian theory does not deserve general condemnation. It is justly
subject to criticism only when it is applied in a mechanical fashion, as
some of its staunchest advocates would have us believe it should be
applied.4 9 Unfortunately, as we shall see, courts do sometimes employ
the theory with an entire disregard of the consequences to the parties
before them, but often the decisions are more just than the language of
the courts. Indeed, it is interesting to note that the two cases which are
perhaps most cited in American legal literature as illustrating the Black-
stonian theory did not, in fact, give retroactive effect to the overruling
decision. We refer to the cases of Stockton v. Dundee Manufacturing
"'Kenyon v. Welty, 20 Cal. 637 (1862); Pittsburgh & L. A. Iron Co. v. Lake
Superior Iron Co., 118 Mich. 109, 76 N. W. 395 (1898); Doll v. Earle, 59 N. Y.
638 (1874); Henderson v. Folkestone Waterworks Co., 1 T. L. R. 329 (Q. B.
1885).
" See KEENER, THE LAW OF QUASI-CONTRACTS (1893) 85 et seq.; WoODWARD,
THE LAw OF QUASI CONTRACTS (1913) 57 et seq.8 RE STATEmENT, RESTITUTION (1937) §45.
" Zane, German Legal Philosophy (1918) 16 MIcH. L. REv. 287, 339: "Every
judicial act resulting in a judgment consists of a pure deduction. . . . The old
syllogism, 'All men are mortal, Socrates is a man, therefore he is mortal', states
the exact form of a judicial judgment."
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Co.50 and Falconer v. Simnons.51 In the first of these the New Jersey
court stated in unequivocal language that the law was to be applied as
'declared in ihe last and overruling Legal Tender decision, so that the
defendant's tender of greenbacks was to be regarded as good and suf-
ficient at the time it was made; but, the court said: ". . . a tender of the
mortgage debt does not, in this state, discharge the lien of the mort-
gage .... "52 The West Virginia court, in the Falconer case, had greater
difficulty in extricating itself and the litigant before it from -difficulty
after holding that the latter's remedy had always been by appeal rather
than by certiorari, as an erroneous decision had led him to believe. The
court's language affords an illuminating illustration of the manner in
which theory not infrequently yields to realities in this field. The court
said:
"Now while the case of Barlow v. Daniels prevailed no appeal could
be gotten from a justice. That seems to me to constitute good excuse
for a failure to apply to the justice and for applying to a judge ...
We now hold that such a writ under the particular circumstances of
this case can be made to answer the purpose of an appeal. True, it is
pretty difficult to so hold, it somewhat jars against strong principles;
but the call of justice, the plain right of the party to have the judgment
reviewed in the circuit court, have impelled us in the spirit of liberality
in a matter of mere form of procedure to hold the writ of certiorari
under the circumstances to be efficacious. It is rather straining a point
to do so, we confess; but the arguments against doing so are rather
technical than substantial.
' ' 53
2. EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE THAT THE LAW OF OVERRULING
DECISIONS SHALL BE APPLIED RETROSPECTIVELY
Because courts have, on the whole, preferred to squirm and attempt
to give what eems to be justice rather than to follow their theory to
its logical conclusion, the cases where the courts apply or 'do not apply
the law retroactively present no very definite pattern. In examining
these cases it is necessary to watch the actual decision closely if we
would not be misled by the language of the court. 54 By so doing we
5022 N. J. Eq. 56 (1871).
6151 W. Va. 172, 41 S. E. 193 (1902).
52 Stockton v. Dundee Mfg. Co., 22 N. J. Eq. 56, 57 (1871).
' Falconer v. Simmons, 51 W. Va. 172, 179, 41 S. E. 193, 196 (1902). It is
to be noted that procedural cases present the easiest problem.
"' Such errors are by no means uncommon. For example, see Freeman, The
Protection Afforded Against the Retroactive Operation of an Overruling Decision
(1918) 18 Cor. L. REv. 230, 239, where the Stockton and Falconer cases are cited
in support of this proposition: "A strict and logical adherence to this doctrine
(the Blackstonian theoryl has led many courts to refuse to circumvent in any
way the retroactive effect of an overruling decision."
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can sketch roughly a number of exceptions to the theory that the law
of the cases is to be applied retrospectively as well as prospectively.
The first of these exceptions which we shall examine is in the field
of the criminal law. Here we find courts stating roundly: "The doctrine
of stare decisis in criminal cases cannot be carried to the extent of al-
lowing to violators of law a vested interest in rules which have been
erroneously sanctioned." 55 But in many cases the courts are loath to
abrogate what they consider "rules of personal liberty" by giving a
new rule retroactive effect. 50 As examples of this tendency we find
that the Iowa court refused to give retroactive effect to a new rule hold-
ing a criminal statute (liquor law) valid when the court had previously
held it to be unconstitutional in a unanimous opinion.5 7 The Mississippi
court, whose language is quoted immediately above, declined to give
retroactive effect to a more stringent construction of a statute making
it a crime to receive deposits, having good reason to believe the receiv-
ing bank to be insolvent. 58 In reversing a conviction under an agricul-
tural tenancy statute, the Supreme Court of North Carolina said:
"While we hold the law to be as stated, we are embarrassed in applying
this ruling to this case. It may be that these defendants have acted upon
the advice of counsel based upon the decision of this Court in S. v. Aeal,
supra. If so, to try them by the law as herein announced would be an
injustice. . . If the defendants shall be able to establish their defense
in accordance with the ruling in Neal's case they are entitled to do so,
but the construction now put upon the statute will be applied to all
future cases." 59
One of the most peculiar cases in this field, and one which seems
to lead us to the heart of the subject, is the North Carolina case of
State v. Fulton. ° This was an appeal to a five-judge court from an
order quashing an indictment. Three judges voted to overrule an old
construction of a criminal statute to the effect that a husband could
"Lanier v. State, 57 Miss. 102, 107 (1879). Accord: Gross v. State, 135
Miss. 624, 100 So. 177 (1924) ; Commonwealth v. Castellana, 277 Pa. 177, 121 Atl
50 (1923) ; State v. Williams, 13 S. C. 546 (1880).
" See People v. Tompkins, 186 N. Y. 413, 416, 79 N. E. 326, 327 (1906),
where the court says that it is not for it, but for the legislature, to make a desirable
change in the-criminal law. The court says: "We cannot change the existing rule
without enacting, in effect, an ex post facto law. This cannot be done without
ignoring the constitutional rights of many who may legally claim the protection
of the rule. Neither can it be done without judicial usurpation of legislative
power." This contains a large element of good sense, but the talk about constitu-
tional rights seem to be nothing more than judicial rhetoric since the prohibition
of ex post facto laws contained in Article I, Section 10, of the Federal Constitution
is a limitation on the legislative and not the judicial branch of the state govern-
ments. Frank v. Mangum, 237 U. S. 309, 35 Sup. Ct. 582, 59 L. ed. 969 (1915).
"7 State v. O'Neil, 147 Iowa 513, 126 N. W. 454 (1910).
"s State v. Longino, 109 Miss. 125, 67 So. 902 (1915).
"9 State v. Bell, 136 N. C. 674, 676, 49 S. E. 163, 164 (1904).
" 149 N. C. 485, 63 S. E. 145 (1908).
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not be guilty criminally for slandering his wife. Two judges were of a
contrary opinion, and one of the three others joined with them to dis-
miss on the grounds that the new construction of the statute should
not be given retroactive effect. The writer of a Yale Law Journal case
note approves highly of the protection afforded the wife slanderer in
this case.6 1 He proceeds to say that the new rule should be denied
retroactive effect or should operate retrospectively to the prejudice of
the accused according to whether the offense is malum prohibitum or
inalum in se. It seems that he is on the track of a distinction, but his
recourse to the old terminology of the law is productive of confusion.
His application of it to State v. Fulton proves this.
It is hard to think of one justifiably relying on the advice of counsel
when setting out to slander his wife.62 In fact, the Mississippi wife
beater,0 3 who was not spared by the law, seems to merit more manly
sympathy than does the slandering husband. It would be a distinction
without substance to say that a statute was involved in the one case and
not in the other. The true answer is that conduct, which, in the one
case, was considered but a proper exercise of the husband's marital
authority and, in the other case, was beyond the reach of the law be-
cause of its fiction of the identity of the husband and wife, has become
so contrary to the mores of the community as to move the law to inter-
vene. And when a course of action becomes sufficiently offensive to the
society in which one lives, the individual addicted to such behavior can
expect that it will be held criminal. It is true that this is the assump-
tion as to acts nalum in se; but through the course of centuries the
division of crimes into malum in se and nalum prohibitim has assumed
an arbitrary cast which makes the old classifications an unsatisfactory
guide for determining whether or not overruling decisions should be
applied retroactively. For this reason it seems best to pass over the
old classifications and look to the reason on which they were founded.
And the complaint of neither the wife beater nor the wife slanderer
can stand when examined in the light of the popular mores.
On the other hand, when the new rule forbids a course of action
in a field where, in the language of Blackstone, the choice of rules of
action was indifferent before, then it seems that the court should, and
generally does, decline to prejudice a party by subjecting him to the
new rule ex post facto. There are other cases where the new rule pro-
hibits action which was before only slightly offensive to popular opinion
" Note (1909) 18 YALE L. J. 422.
" "Anyone who would defame another, relying upon existing rules of law to
shield him from liability for his deliberate wrong doing, deserves no special con-
sideration from a court by reason of such reliance." Carpenter, Stare Decisis
and Law Reform (1927) 1 So. CALIF. L. REv. 53, 63.
" Gross v. State, 135 Miss. 624, 100 S. 177 (1924), cited supra notes 18 and 55.
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or objectionable to only a limited part of the public; 6 4 and in these cases
it seems that the court is inclined not to give the new rule retroactive
effect. If this be true, it seems that we have a nebulous line separating
those cases where the defendant suffers from ex post facto application
of the law from those cases where he is spared. The sheep to be saved
are those who relied, actually or presumptively, on a rule of law which
is not so obnoxious to public opinion, as interpreted by the courts, that
reliance on it is not to be deemed justifiable; the goats are those who
seek to rely on a rule of law which is so contrary to the mores that the
court feels no one is entitled to rely on it. Perhaps it would be well
for the courts to limit the first half of this rule to actual reliance, but
they do not seem to have done so. However, with or without this limi-
tation, this rule, thus broadly stated, is about as satisfactory a guide as
we can construct to assist in applying or declining to apply the Black-
stonian theory in the criminal law field.
We come now to the consideration of the protection accorded to
contract rights against the effect of overruling decisions. Here we have
what is perhaps the most frequently recognized exception to the rule
that court law is to be given retrospective operation. There has been an
effort to invoke the contracts clause of the Federal Constitution,6 5 but,
despite favorable dicta by Mr. Chief Justice Taney, 66 this attempt has
been unsuccessful. 67 The Supreme Court says: "As this Court has
repeatedly ruled, the Constitution affords no protection as against an
impairment by judicial decision."'68  Mr. Justice Brandeis expresses the
rule and its reason thus: "The process of trial and error, of change of
decision in order to conform with changing ideas and conditions, is
traditional with courts administering the common law. Since it is for
the state courts to interpret and declare the law of the State, it is for
them to correct their errors and declare what the law has been as well
"As State v. O'Neil, 147 Iowa 513, 126 N. W. 454 (1910), cited supra note
57 (prohibition law) ; State v. Longino, 109 Miss. 125, 67 So. 902 (1915), cited
supra note 58 (restriction on receipt of bank deposits); State v. Bell, 136
N. C. 674, 49 S. E. 163 (1904), cited supra note 59 (limitation on tenant's right
to dispose of crop).
" Art. I. §10. "No State shall ... pass any ... Law impairing the Obligation
of Contracts. . .."
"O hio Life Ins. & Trust Co. v. Debolt, 16 How. 416, 432, 14 L. ed. 997,
1003 (U. S. 1853).
" Central Land Co. v. Laidley, 159 U. S. 103, 16 Sup. Ct. 80, 40 L. ed. 91
(1895) Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan, 263 U. S. 444, 44 Sup. Ct. 197, 68 L. ed. 382
(1924); Fleming v. Fleming, 264 U. S. 29, 44 Sup. Ct. 246, 68 L. ed. 547 (1924).
For possible exception see note 68, infra.
"8 Columbia Ry., Gas & Electric Co. v. South Carolina, 261 U. S. 236, 244,
43 Sup. Ct. 306, 308, 67 L. ed. 629, 633 (1923). But note that this decision shows
jealousy of the state court's freedom. The opinion says: "But, although the state
court may have construed the contract and placed its decision distinctly upon its
own construction, if it appear, upon examination, that in real substance and effect,
force has been given to the statute complained of our jurisdiction attaches."
Id. at 245, 43 Sup. Ct. at 308, 67 L. ed. at 633.
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as what it is. State courts, like this Court, may ordinarily overrule
their own decisions without offending constitutional guaranties, even
though parties may have acted to their prejudice on the faith of the
earlier decisions."
69
There has been but one rule applied in the federal courts which has
protected contracts from the effect of overruling decisions, and it has
not rested upon any provision of the Constitution. Like the rule of
Swift v. Tyson o7 it has been one of the conspicuous anomalies of our
federal system. It is the principle associated with the case of Gelpcke v.
Dubuque7l from which it stems, and is to the effect that the federal
courts in the trial of cases arising within their jurisdiction need not
apply the latest decision of the state supreme court on a statutory or
constitutional question when to do so would prejudice contract rights
of parties before it, which rights were acquired in reliance on prior de-
cisions of the state court.72 The application of this rule has meant that
the success of litigants has turned on the fortuitous circumstance that
they had, or had not, grounds for access to the federal court. But now
it is doubtful if even this measure of federal protection from the effect
of the overruling decision remains, for the case of Erie R. R. v. Tomp-
kins73 seems to impugn the basis of the rule. 74
But as we are not here interested in the conflicts question which the
rule of the municipal bond cases raise, or in the implications of the
Erie case, we shall pass on to the consideration of the protection which
the state courts afford to contract rights. Here we find some few courts
citing the Gelpcke case and applying it, apparently under the belief that
the Federal Constitution-presumably the contracts clause-requires
them to do so.7 5 However, it seems that generally where courts protect
contract rights, they do so as a matter of policy rather than because of
a misinterpretation of their constitutional obligation.
We find courts very ready to say that, "Decisions long acquiesced
in, which constitute rules of proper t or trade, or upon which impor-
tant rights are based, should not be 'disturbed, even though erroneous
" Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Savings Co. v. Hill, 281 U. S. 673, 681, 50 Sup.
Ct. 451. 454, 74 L. ed. 1107, 1114 (1930). The exception which the quotation sug-
gests falls under the due process rather than the contracts clause. It vill be
discussed under procedure.
70 16 Pet. 1, 10 L. ed. 865 (U. S. 1842).
7 1 Wall. 175, 17 L. ed. 519 (U. S. 1864).
72 Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 1 Wall. 175, 17 L. ed. 519 (U. S. 1864) ; Douglass v.
County of Pike, 101 U. S. 677, 25 L. ed. 968 (1880).
71304 U. S. 64, 58 Sup. Ct. 817, 82 L. ed. 1188 (1938).
7' Long, A Warning Signal for Municipal Bondholders: Some Implications of
Erie Railroad v. Tompkins (1939) 37 MICH. L. REv. 589; McCormick and
Hewins, The Collapse of "General" Law in the Federal Courts (1938) 33 ILL.
L. RE v. 126, 137.
" Thomas v. State, 76 Ohio St. 341, 81 N. E. 437 (1907) ; Walker v. South
Carolina, 12 S. C. 200 (1879) ; see Vermont & Canada R. R. v. Vermont Central
R. R., 63 Vt. 1, 23, 21 Atl. 262, 267 (1890).
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as original holdings." 7  And when they do change their construction
of statutory or constitutional provisions upon which contract rights,
executory or executed, are dependent they frequently decline to give
their new construction retroactive effect so as to allow it to defeat con-
tract rights and vitiate titles.77 As the Pennsylvania court explained:
"Judgmerit is therefore rendered for the plaintiff on the special verdict,
not because he has the law, but because he was entitled to believe that
he had it when he took the mortgage on which he sues."1 8 Further, the
Alabama court, in declining to give retroactive application, prejudicial
to a mortgagee, to its new ruling to the effect that the statutes of the
state did not remove the disability of coverture so as to enable a married
woman to mortgage her property, said: "Persons contracting are pre-
sumed to know the existing law, but neither they nor their legal ad-
visers are expected to know the law better than the courts, or to know
what the law will be at some future day. Any principle or rule, which
deprives a person of property acquired by him, or the benefit of a con-
tract entered into in reliance upon and strict compliance with the law
in all respects as interpreted and promulgated by the court of last resort,
at the time of the transaction, and no fault can be imputed to him in
the matter of the contract, unless it be held a fault not to foresee and
provide against future alterations in the construction of the law, must
be radically wrong. Such a principle, or rule of law would clog busi-
ness transactions, unsettle titles, and destroy all confidence in the de-
cisions of the Supreme Court of the State."7 9
Most courts are inclined to state the exception baldly; and, if they
set out to sustain it argumentatively, they generally argue in the above
manner, much as would a layman who was interested in results and
given to appraising them in terms of what he considered justice and
common sense. However, there have been efforts to work out a logical
basis for the exception. For example, the North Carolina court seems
to consider the law as announced by the court as a tacit stipulation in
contracts made in reliance thereon.8 0 And counsel for appellant in
7' State ex rel. Pitts v. Nashville Baseball Club, 127 Tenn, 292, 303, 154 S. W.
1151, 1154 (1913). Accord: Laclede Land & Improvement Co. v. Schneider,
177 S. W. 388 (Mo. 1915). See also von "Moschzisker, Stare Decisis ht Courts of
Last Resort (1924) 37 HARv. L. REv. 409, 415.
"Farrior v. New England Mortgage Security Co.. 92 Ala. 176, 9 So. 532
(1891); Eagle v. Corbin, 275 Ky. 808, 122 S. W. (2d) 798 (1938); Payne v.
Covington, 276 Ky. 380, 123 S. W. (2d) 1045 (1938) ; Ebert v. Board of Educa-
tion, 277 Ky. 633, 126 S. W. (2d) 1111 (1939) ; World Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v.
Tapp, 279 Ky. 423, 130 S. W. (2d) 848 (1939); Hill v. Brown, 144 N. C. 117,
56 S. E. 693 (1907) ; Menges v. Dentler, 33 Pa. 495 (1859) ; Geddes v. Brown,
5 Phila. 180 (Pa. 1863); see Center School Township v. State, 150 Ind. 168,
173. 49 N. E. 961, 963 (1898). Contra: Hibbits v. Jack, 97 Ind. 570 (1884).)
7' Geddes v. Brown, 5 Phila. 180 (Pa. 1863).
" Farrior v. New England Mortgage Security Co., 92 Ala. 176, 181, 9 So.
532, 533 (1891)." Hill v. Brown, 144 N. C. 117, 56 S. E. 693 (1907). "We deduce the well-
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Fleming v. Flemilg 8l argued unsuccessfully but ingeniously to the ef-
fect that a decision interpreting a statute inhered in the statute and
became a part of it so that a new construction, if given retroactive
effect, amounted to a statutory impairment of the obligation of contract.
When we come to the consideration of situations where a forfeiture
is effected by giving retroactive effect to an overruling 'decision, we
find some of the worst examples of the mechanical application of the
Blackstonian theory. A decision of the Supreme Court of Washington
offers an excellent illustration. In 1906 that court held a city ordinance
providing for licensing of plumbers to be contrary to the state and
Federal constitutions.82 In 1930 this case was reversed, and such an
ordinance was held to be a valid exercise of the police power. 83 In
Lund v. Bruflat84 the court gave this new rule retroactive effect and
held that, as Lund had held no license, he was not authorized to make
such a contract for plumbing as that on which he sued. The court then
held that as the plaintiff had performed the plumbing services under
an illegal contract, he was not entitled to recover on the contract or in
quantu n meruit for the value of his services. Thus, the court imposed
the severe sanction of forfeiture, which is designed to secure observance
of police statutes, upon one who, acting in good faith and with legal
advice, could not have been expected to act differently. But the court
cut off only one of the plaintiff's arms in order to vindicate the law.
It found the provisions of the contract to be so severable in nature as
to allow it to affirm the judgment of the court below in so far as it
allowed recovery for materials furnished. It is submitted that the court
should have permitted the plaintiff to recover on both counts rather
than merely to relieve him in part from the forfeiture by applying the
rule of severability.
The New York court, in Harris v. Jex, 5 affords us an example of
how such situations should be met. There the defendant in a foreclosure
settled principle from a number of authorities, that the law of contract enters
into the contract itself and, in the construction, forms a part of it. It is practically
a dormant stipulation in the contract, and it must be enforced as a part of it,
and as it is construed at the time the contract is made." Id. at 119, 56 S. E.
at 693.
81264 U. S. 29, 31, 44 Sup. Ct. 246, 247, 68 L. ed. 547, 549 (1924). Cf:
State v. Haid, 327 Mo. 567, 38 S. W. (2d) 44 (1931) ; Continental Supply Co. v.
Abell, 95 Mont. 148, 24 P. (2d) 133 (1933); Wilkinson v. Wallace, 192 N. C.
156. 134 S. E. 401 (1926).
"Richey v. Smith, 42 Wash. 237, 84 Pac. 851 (1906).
"' Tacoma v. Fox, 158 Wash. 325, 290 Pac. 1010 (1930). "The Richey case
has not met with favor in other jurisdictions, having been followed, so far as we
are advised, only by the supreme court of Arkansas." Id. at 330, 290 Pac. at 1012.
This was a criminal prosecution and the decision operated retroactively but the
defendant was subjected to only a small fine.
8 159 Wash. 89, 292 Pac. 112 (1930), (1931) 26 Im- L. REv. 347.
8555 N. Y. 421 (1874) ; cf: Stockton v. Dundee Mfg. Co., 22 N. J. Eq. 56
(1871) (contra in language, but in accord in result).
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suit, who had purchased the mortgaged property, but had not assumed
the mortgage debt, pleaded as a defense that he had tendered payment
which had been refused, and that the lien of the plaintiff's mortgage
had been thereby extinguished. His tender was made in notes after
Hepburn v. Griswold8 6 had declared the Legal Tender Act to be invalid,
and before this decision was reversed in Knox v. Lee.s 7 The court
held: "The plaintiff had a right to repose upon the decision of the high-
est judicial tribunal in the land. It was, as applied to the relations be-
tween these parties and to this case, the law, and not the mere evidence
of the law." s88 It seems that this decision is fully justified on the grounds
that forfeitures are highly technical and often unfortunate in their con-
sequence and that where, as here, the hardship will be even greater than
usual, the court of equity will relieve from the forfeiture. Here, justi-
fiable reliance on the first Legal Tender case should certainly warrant
such relief.
An analogous problem arises in the case of Laabs v. Wisconsin Tax
Commission8 9 where, after the reversal of the Rockwood case,90 Laabs
was assessed back taxes plus six per cent. The majority of the court
held the latter good as the equivalent of interest for the use of the
money, but there was a dissent on the grounds that this was a penalty
which should not be levied on a party for failure to pay a tax which the
state authorities, under the decisions, would have declined to receive.
On his construction of the facts, the -dissenting judge's opinion seems
obviously correct.
All of, the cases which we have considered thus far involve the
overruling of an earlier decision of the Federal Supreme Court or of
a state supreme court. A Florida decision offers an interesting varia-
tion from the general factual situation.9 1 In it the petitioner brought
mandamus to test the legality of an order revoking his license to prac-
tice dentistry because he had allowed an unlicensed party to practice
with him contrary to the provisions of the state statute. The petitioner
sought to justify his action as being based on a decision of an inferior
court holding the act invalid. This -decision had been subsequently re-
86 8 Wall. 603, 19 L. ed. 513 (U. S. 1870).87 12 Wall. 457, 20 L. ed. 287 (U. S. 1871).
88 Harris v. Jex, 55 N. Y. 421, 424 (1874). It is to be noted that the court
relied to some extent on a statute (2 N. Y. REv. STAT. (1867) §66), but this
statute was not controlling. It provided that no one should suffer any penalty or
forfeiture because of reliance on a construction of statute by the state supreme
court which construction was subsequently reversed by the Court for the Correc-
tion of Errors. Except by way of analogy it had no application to the Legal
Tender cases involved in Harris v. Je.r.
88218 Wis. 414, 261 N. W. 404 (1935), (1936) 3 U. oF CHI. L. REV. 332.
"Long v. Rockwood, 277 U. S. 142, 48 Sup. Ct. 463, 72 L. ed. 824 (1928),
rev'd, Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U. S. 123, 52 Sup. Ct. 546, 76 L. ed., 1010
(1932).
"' Williams v. Whitman, 116 Fla. 196, 156 So. 705 (1934).
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versed on appeal to the supreme court, but the court held that until
such reversal the petitioner was justified in relying on it. The court
justified its holding that the petitioner's license was improperly revoked
on two grounds. First, that the statute "has reference to a conscious
and culpable act amounting to wilful design", and that these elements
were not present. Second, that in the case of an act only maluin pro-
hibitum a party is entitled "to rely upon the expressed decisions of a
competent court of general jurisdiction". It seems that the second
reason assigned is really the foundation of the first. Such a rationale
offers a desirable means for relieving a party from an oppressive pen-
J
alty. The court, just as the average individual would be inclined to do.
gives weight to a rule of law even though it was pronounced by a court
whose decisions were subject to appeal; and, recognizing the natural
effects of the pronouncement of such a rule, it declines to enforce a
penalty when to do so would go beyond the purpose for which the pen-
alty was established.
0 2
B. Effect on Procedure and Jurisdiction
In the procedure field we find the single exception to the rule that
the United States Constitution interposes no bar to prevent the state
courts from giving retroactive effect to their decisions. The case of
Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Savings Co. v. Hill 93 sets out this exception.
In it the plaintiff sought equitable relief from a tax assessment, but the
Missouri court 94 declined to give such relief, because it said that the
plaintiff had had an adequate remedy available at law. The legal rem-
edy said to have been available was petition to the tax board for a re-
duction of assessment; but previous decisions of the state supreme court
characterized such procedure as "preposterous" and "unthinkable".
And when, in the case in hand, the court first recognized the propriety
of such procedure. lapse of time made it no longer available to the
plaintiff. Thus the Supreme Court of Missouri denied relief because
the plaintiff had not had recourse earlier to a procedure which it had
92 Contra: State v. Striggles, 202 Iowa 1318. 210 N. W. 137 (1926). It was
held to be no defense in a criminal action that the defendant had relied on a
decision of a municipal court, subsequently reversed, to the effect that certain
machines, which he was charged with operating, were not gambling devices.
The court said: "We are disposed to hold with the O'Neil case, that, when the
court of highest jurisdiction passes on any given proposition, all citizens are en-
titled to rely upon such decision; but we refuse to hold that the decisions of any
court below, inferior to the Supreme Court, are available as a defense, under simi-
lar circumstances." Id. at 1320, 210 N. W. at 138. But note that the court said that
the dismissal of the case would not have been subject to criticism, and it called
attention with apparent approval to the fact that the defendant had been assessed
the minimum fine. See Muller Dairies v. Baldwin, 242 App. Div. 296, 299, 274
N. Y. Supp. 975, 978 (3d Dep't 1934).
03281 U. S. 673, 50 Sup. Ct. 451, 74 L. ed. 1107 (1930).
" Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Savings Co. v. Hill, 323 Mo. 180, 19 S. W. (2d)
746 (1929).
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emphatically declared to be improper. On rehearing the plaintiff un-
successfully raised the question of -due process. In the Supreme Court
of the United States, however, it was successful on the ground that it
had not been accorded due process in the primary sense of being al-
lowed to present its case 'and be heard in support of it. This exception
is limited to procedural law and has nothing to do with substantive
law; and it does not aid a party who in the absence of decision makes
a bad guess as to his statutory remedy and finds himself without one.
It simply prescribes that, under the Fourteenth Amendment, a state
court cannot give retroactive effect to an overruling decision on a point
of adjective law when the result would be to deny a party the oppor-
tunity to adjudicate his rights. The Brinkerhoff case seems sufficient to
convince one of the desirability of enforcing such procedural 'due process
on the state courts.
This rule will not affect most procedural cases in the state courts;
but generally the courts seem more willing than did the Missouri court
to protect a party in such a case. Falconer v. Simmons, 6 quoted at
length above, is an example of a case where a different decision was
reached in an almost identical situation. Also, the Louisiana Court of
Appeal, in a recent case, declined to let the rule of a new decision on
a point of procedure operate retrospectively so as to deprive the plain-
tiff of the opportunity of present valuable claims.96 The court said:
"We believe that jurisprudence, though later overruled, should rule
and control intermediate transactions."
9 7
Indeed, where a change of procedural rules would adversely affect
titles9 8 or accrued rights of action,99 the courts seem especially willing
to decline to give overruling decisions retrospective effect. But,. as has
been said, relief in such cases is accorded as a matter of policy and not
of right, and the court may deem it desirable to refuse it.100 And when
" 51 W. Va. 172, 41 S. E. 193 (1902), cited supra note 51; c: State v. Haid,
327 Mo. 567, 38 S. W. (2d) 44 (1931); Koebel v. Tieman Coal & Material Co.,
337 Mo. 561, 85 S. W. (2d) 519 (1935).
90 Norton v. Crescent City Ice Mfg. Co., 146 So. 753 (La. App. 1933), rehearbng
denied, 147 So. 385 (La. App. 1933). But the court followed this principle sub-
stantially rather than exactly. It sent the plaintiff back to start over without pre-
judice, but he was forced to suffer loss of time and taxation of costs.
97 Id. at 757.
9s Jones v. Woodstock Iron Co., 95 Ala. 551, 10 So. 635- (1892) ; Hill v. Brown,
144 N. C. 117; 56 S. E. 693 (1907).
" Montana Horse Products Co. v. Great Northern Ry., 91 Mont., 194, 7 P.
(2d) 919 (1932); Sunburst Oil & Refining Co. v. Great Northern Ry., 91 Mont.
216, 7 P. (2d) 927 (1932).
100 Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Scanlon, 266 Ky. 785, 100 S. W. (2d)
223 (1936) ; O'Malley v. O'Malley, 272 Pa. 528, 116 At. 500 (1922). In the
former case, a new interpretation of the statute of limitations was given retro-
active effect so as to permit the prosecution of plaintiff's claim. This seems
desirable; but, on the other hand, a decision shortening the statutory period would
effect a denial of primary due process if it were applied retroactively to cut off a
claim. The claimant, who is the moving party, could have brought his action
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we pass into the field of criminal law, as we have seen, there are cases
where it seems desirable for new rules as to procedure or jurisdiction
to have an ex post facto effect.' 0 '
It is necessary to notice now the great limitation on the relief given
by the courts from retroactive decisions. With two exceptions' 0 2 all
the cases in which we have seen relief given from the operation of the
Blackstonian theory have been cases involving a new declaration of the
written rather than the common law..0 3 The North Carolina court sum-
marizes the exception and states the limits of it thus: "The general prin-
ciple is that a decision of a court of supreme jurisdiction overruling a
former decision is retrospective in its operation, and the effect is not
that the former decision is bad law, but that it never was the law.
[Cits.] To this the courts have established the exception that where a
constitutional or statute law has received a given construction by the
courts of last resort, and contracts have been made and rights acquired
under and in accordance with such construction, such contracts may
not be invalidated nor vested rights acquired under them impaired by
a change of construction made by a subsequent decision. [Cits.] And
there is high authority for the position that this is the only exception
that should be allowed. Falconer v. Simmons, 51 W. Va. 172. And
while this Court, in a case of unusual hardship, has extended the prin-
ciple of this exception to a criminal cause, in S. z,. Bell, 136 N. C. 674--
a cause it will be noted, arising on the construction of a statute-and.
in another decision, to a case where a title to real estate had vested
(Hill v. Brown, 144 N. C. 117), the principle should certainly not be
further extended and applied to an erroneous decision on general mer-
cantile lav which is contrary to accepted doctrine and recognized busi-
ness methods.'
0 4
The refusal to afford equal protection to those who have relied on a
judicial declaration of common law seems, in the main, illogical and
arbitrary.10 5 It is probably to be explained as an instance where the
courts, in the interests of justice, sacrifice logic to create an exception,
but, because of judicial conservatism, do not apply it in full. Such a
limitation can be rationalized by the bench on the grounds of a differ-
ence between statutory and common law; it can be urged that the one
sooner, but the erroneous pronouncement of the shorter period could hardly be of
substantial prejudice to the party against whom the claim was made.
101 Commonwealth v. Castellana, 277 Pa. 117, 121 At. 50 (1923); State v.
Williams, 13 S. C. 546 (1880).
... Jones v. Woodstock Iron Co., 95 Ala. 551, 10 So. 635 (1892) ; World Fire &
Marine Ins. Co. v. Tapp, 279 Ky. 423, 130 S. W. (2d) 848 (1939).
10'This is one explanation of Gross v. State, 135 Miss. 624, 100 So. 177
(1924), cited supra note 63.
1"4 Mason v. Nelson Cotton Co., 148 N. C. 492, 510, 62 S. E. 625, 632 (1908).
.0 See Freeman, The Protection Afforded Against the Retroactive Operation
of an Overriding Decision (1918) 18 COL. L. REV. 230, 244.
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is tangible while the other is of such a vague and nebulous character
that parties must of necessity take the risk of their interpretation and
the court's future decisions. 1 6 Perhaps the concluding lines of the
above quotation suggest some justification for this rationalization. The
common law is sprung more immediately from the life and customs of
people, so that a party may better anticipate change in it than in the
interpretation of statutory law which is, presumably, a permanent ex-
pression of the legislature's intent. But this seems to go only to the
question of the justification for reliance on the overruled decision. The
law makes haste slowly, but it is to be hoped that eventually the same
protection will be accorded those who rely on common law decisions as
those who act on the strength of the judicial interpretation of statutes.
III. CONCLUSION
We come now to the question of the protection which should be
afforded these parties.' 0 7 Some writers have suggested that courts
after handing down an overruling decision should decline to give it
retroactive effect to the prejudice of litigants subsequently coming be-
fore it. They would, however, give the overruling decision retroactive
effect as to the parties involved. This is held necessary to get rid of an
objectionable rule, "but once rid of the rule there is no call for the
sacrifice of more victims upon the altar of reform" 108 This discloses a
difficult problem. If the new rule be announced by a judicial decision,
rather than by means of dicta, the decision will generally apply it retro-
actively to the prejudice of some one. And if this first party is preju-
diced, it seems hard later to judge another by a more favorable rule.' 0 9
To do so seems to give the law such an arbitrary cast that it is difficult
to think that such a rule, regularly applied, would meet with approval. 1" 0
It has been proposed that in cases where a court changes a rule of
law upon which parties have relied, the court should apply the old rule
to the case before it and merely announce the new rule for prospective
... It is -hardly necessary to remark that all rules of common law are not of
one type. Some are by no means vague or nebulous."07 We pass over the cognate question of the effect of a judicial change in the
law upon a case in process of litigation when the appellate court has previously
held a different rule to be applicable to it. This problem of "the law of the case",
with its theories and practices, presents a question which is too extensive for dis-
cussion within the compass of this study.
.0. Carpenter, Court Decisions and the Common Law (1917) 17 COL. L. REv.
593, 606. See Barker v. St. Louis County, 340 Mo. 986, 1003, 104 S. W. (2d)
371, 379 (1937).
100 This would not be true of a case which turns on a decision in an action
of another kind as did Harris v. Jex, 55 N. Y. 421 (1874), cited supra note 85.
110 There is, however, the justification for it that it gives the benefit of retro-
active operation of the new rule to the party who, vigilant of his rights, first
convinces the court of its former error and thereby, presumably, performs a
service to society.
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operation."' While this method is not new, 1 2 it has received special
attention of late. This seems to be due to the publicity incident to a
decision by the Supreme Court of the United States to the effect that
if a state court wishes to follow this procedure, there is no provision of
the Federal Constitution to prevent it from so doing. 113 The procedure
followed in this, the Sunburst Oil case, in the state court, has been much
discussed and has received a measure of approval. 14
On the other hand, however, a number of objections have been
raised to this suggestion that the court should confine itself to announc-
ing new rules for the future while applying old ones. 1 5 The first is
that such a declaration of rule for the future is undisguised legislation.
This is a great objection to the idealists; but it seems that generally the
court will find the public much less intolerant of judicial legislation in
practice than in theory. This objection seems to carry no weight. If,
however, this procedure be established by statute, 116 rather than under-
taken on judicial initiative, there is a possibility of constitutional diffi-
culties, 1 7 and there is more likelihood of popular suspicion of the
method.
Another objection is that the announcement of the new rule is only
dicta-at most, a prophecy as to how the court will hold the law in the
future. Thereafter shall the public rely on the old rule which was ap-
plied, or the new rule for which the court expressed its preference?
This, however, does not seem a very great objection. A rule so pro-
nounced would not be obiter and so, presumably, ill-considered; there-
fore, it seems that rules thus pronounced for prospective operation
might be regarded as being as good a basis for reliance as the traditional
judicial decision. A party who relied on such an enunciation of the law
should be able to demand the same protection in case of subsequent
change as the party who had acted on the strength of an actual decision.
The great objection to this rule of the limited or prospective opera-
tion of overruling decisions is that it would tend to destroy that capacity
for growth and change which is one of the best characteristics of judge-
made law. The bulk of our law is court law. Such law is case law.
... Canfield, Our Judicial System (1917) S. C. B. A. REP. 66; Freeman,
The Protection Afforded Against the Retroactive Operation of an Overruling
Decision (1918) 18 COL. L. REv. 230; Kocourek, Retrospective Decisions and Stare
Decisis and a Proposal (1931) 17 A. B. A. J. 180.
... State v. Bell, 136 N. C. 674, 49 S. E. 163 (1904).
... Great Northern Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U. S. 358, 53
Sup. Ct. 145, 77 L. ed. 360 (1932).
1' Notes (1933) 11 N. C. L. REV. 323, (1933) 28 ILL. L. REv. 277, (1933) 17
Mir . L. RE V. 811, (1933) 10 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 528, (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 779.
11. For general criticism, see von Moschzisker, Stare Decisis in Courts of Last
Resort (1924) 37 HARv. L. REv. 409.
11. See draft of suggested statute by Kocourek, Retrospective Decisions and
Stare Decisis and a Proposal (1931) 17 A. B. A. J. 180, 182.
""7Eastman v. State, 131 Ohio St. 1, 1 N. E. (2d) 140 (1936).
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Cases are brought and contested by parties, who, in general, are
prompted by self-interest. If a new rule will not be given retroactive
operation, many errors will, in consequence, be frozen in the law. Some
litigants, who have more interest in the rule of law than in the particu-
lar case, would doubtless continue to litigate when the law stood against
them ;""s but the average litigant is interested in his own recovery and
not in improving the law. He would doubtless feel as did Ko-Ko,
Pooh-Bah, and Pitti-Sing when the Mikado said to them about the
statute under which they stood condemned: "That's the slovenly way
in which these Acts are always -drawn. However, cheer up, it'll be all
right. I'll have it altered next session. Now let's see about your execu-
tion-will after luncheon suit you? Can you wait till then?" The
average individual is not such a crusader that the purging of error from
the law will serve to compensate for his loss and prompt him to bring
actions cheerfully to establish rules for prospective operation.
It seems impossible to lay down any principle to be a universal
guide for the application of the law announced in overruling decisions.
Moreover, there seems the danger that the attempt to do by statute
might change the legal problem for the worse and at the same time
create political difficulties. Perhaps it would be desirable to have a
statute to provide that forfeitures shall not be effected and penalties
exacted where a party has acted in justifiable reliance on a judicial
decision. But such a statute could not be a judicial touchstone, for each
case should present the question as to the reasonableness of the reliance
on the former decision.
The simple procedural case presents a problem which seems suscep-
tible of solution by statute. But the borderline between adjective and
substantive law is an invisible one 19 and it seems desirable to treat the
two in the same manner. Legislation to cover this field, unlike a statute
to prevent forfeitures and penalties, would seem to most people to be a
mandate to the courts to legislate. Here there would be political and
perhaps constitutional difficulties in the way of securing the grant of a
power which, as we have seen amply demonstrated, the courts already
possess. If such a statute were more than a mere suggestion, it would
probably operate too rigidly so as to favor unduly as a class those who
relied on the- old rule or their opponents in interest. We think it quite
11. The situation of the railroad company in the Sunburst Oil case furnishes
an example of a recurring interest which might prompt litigation even though
relief in the specific cause in issue were impossible. Because of the prospect of
many future claims, the company is interested in the establishment of what
is to it a more favorable rule governing the recovery of excessive rate charges
exacted by it.
119 For illustration of this, see Montana Horse Products Co. v. Great Northern
Ry., 91 Mont. 194, 7 P. (2d) 919 (1932); Sunburst Oil & Refining Co. v. Great
Northern Ry., 91 Mont. 216, 7 P. (2d) 927 (1932) ; Wilkinson v. Wallace, 192 N.
C. 156, 134 S. E. 401 (1926).
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likely that the greatest social good may come from not treating John
Doe as we treat the Great Northern Railway. The litigant wth recur-
ring interests may well be treated differently from him who comes to
court but once. Moreover, a court may properly be influenced in its
decision by the fact as to whether the rule overturned was clear or
doubtful, as well as by considerations as to whether the action taken
was on the advice of counsel, or as to whether the action involved such
moral elenments as to make reliance unjustified. We would not attempt,
however, to formulate a statute embodying such considerations. What
we desire is that the courts should have a broad discretion and exercise
it in an enlightened manner. They have the first, and the fiat of legisla-
tors cannot ensure the latter.
As a consequence of that quickening tempo of growth and transition
in constitutional law and many other fields, which has led to the re-
examination and restatement of many principles in these last few years,
cases presenting the problem of the effect to be accorded an overruling
decision have been arising with increasing frequency. Moreover, it
seems not unlikely that our courts will be called upon to handle a grow-
ing volume of such litigation in the immediate future. They face this
task equipped with certain principles which might be likened to a new
and specialized equity. This new equity, if we may call it such, is still
in its infancy. The courts are developing it haltingly to ameliorate the
hardships of an arbitrary rule. As yet, as we have seen, it has not
grown to the point where it protects rights and expectations founded
on the unwritten law. The deficiencies and inconsistencies in the rules
applied are patent. But it seems that the best remedy lies with the ju-
diciary. 120 And the bench is becoming increasingly aware of its powers
and responsibilities in this field. It is to be hoped that our judges will
continue to prick out a broader and more just rule as case after case
comes before them, for the principal hope for a happier solution of the
problem of an overruling decision lies in a wider and wiser judicial
discretion.
"' There may, however, be occasions where it seems desirable to settle particu-
lar -problems by legislation as was done by the enactment of the Public Salary
Tax Act of 1939, cited supra note 38.
